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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from 
the district court's order partially denying appellants' 
motion seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds. The appellants are Drug Enforcement 
Administatration ("DEA") agents who applied for a search 
warrant for the appellees' residence and executed the 
warrant the next day. The issues on appeal relate to the 
execution of the warrant. The search was an aspect of an 
extensive DEA investigation into a large cocaine distribution 
ring reputedly run by Geraldo Nieves. During the 
investigation, the DEA secured the cooperation of Blake 
O'Farrow, who had been a participant in the Nieves ring. 
O'Farrow informed DEA Special Agent Matthew Donahue in 
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September and November 1996, and again in January 
1997, that Nieves was using a house at 3936 North Fifth 
Street in Philadelphia for storing, cutting, and bagging 
cocaine. 
 
Based on the information obtained from O'Farrow, as well 
as other information secured during the investigation of the 
Nieves ring, Donahue prepared a probable cause affidavit 
and submitted it to a magistrate judge on January 30, 
1997. That day, the magistrate judge signed a warrant 
authorizing a search of "the property known as 3936 N. 5th 
Street, Philadelphia, PA" for "[c]ocaine, packaging materials, 
dilutents [sic], plastic packaging slips, heat sealer, scales, 
and a vice [sic]." 
 
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on the next day, DEA Agents 
Martin Caplan, Maureen Kelly, Joseph Capone, and 
Jonathan Cohen went to 3936 North Fifth Street to execute 
the warrant.1 Donahue, however, did not go to the premises 
with the other agents. The occupants of the house were 
asleep when the agents arrived but appellee Rosa Maria 
Dominguez awoke to the sound of metal rattling. She went 
back to sleep only to reawaken to the sound of knocking 
and the agents' voices identifying themselves. Appellee 
Juan Angel Torres, who was sleeping in the same room, 
awoke and looked out the window where he saw people 
wearing DEA jackets. Dominguez (who put on a robe) and 
Torres (who wrapped himself in a towel) then went 
downstairs and looked out a ground floor window. Torres 
attempted to signal to the agents that Dominguez would 
open the door, but they nevertheless broke through the 
door with a battering ram. 
 
The agents entered the home, pointed their guns at 
Torres and Dominguez, and ordered them to lie on the 
floor. The agents placed Torres but not Dominguez in 
handcuffs. The agents asked whether there were any 
weapons in the house, and Torres told them the location of 
two firearms in his bedroom. After he had been on the floor 
for about five minutes, Torres, still clad in his towel, was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The factual record relating to the execution of the warrant derives 
largely from the appellees' depositions as the appellees did not depose 
the agents. 
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helped to the living room couch. Dominguez then was 
permitted to attend to the couple's two children upstairs. 
The agents did not point their guns at anyone after the 
initial entry. 
 
The agents searched the entire premises. In their 
deposition testimony, Torres and Dominguez gave wide 
estimates for the duration of the search, varying from one 
and one-half to three hours. During this time, Torres (who 
remained handcuffed), Dominguez, and the children sat 
together on the couch. At some point, the agents permitted 
Dominguez to make breakfast for the children, and, in 
Torres's words, the children received nothing but"nice 
comments" from the agents. Eventually, the agents removed 
the handcuffs and allowed Torres to get dressed so that he 
could escort the agents to the building where he worked.2 
 
The agents did not find drugs or drug paraphernalia in 
the home. They, however, seized several items, including a 
Glock 9mm semiautomatic handgun, a Ruger .357 
magnum revolver, ammunition for those two weapons plus 
ammunition for a third weapon which they did not locate, 
a roll of plastic tape, and various papers, including 
earnings statements, phone cards, and a gas bill. These 
items were returned to appellees within five days. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Appellees filed their complaint in the district court on 
September 16, 1997. Ultimately, after amendments, the 
appellees asserted that they were entitled to recover under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act and directly under the 
Constitution for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations 
with respect to the issuance and execution of the warrant. 
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971). Following 
discovery, the agents moved for summary judgment, and 
the district court partially granted their motion analyzing 
the appellees' claims under the Fourth Amendment alone. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to appellees' amended complaint, after the agents completed 
the search of appellees' home, they conducted a warrantless search of 
property owned by "plaintiff 's father." 
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The district court held that appellees failed to allege a 
constitutional violation with respect to the agents' conduct 
up to and including the initial entry into appellees' home. 
In this regard, the court first determined that there was 
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The court 
then found that the agents had no reason to believe that 
they were executing the warrant at the wrong location. In 
so ruling, the court declined to place any significance in the 
fact that the warrant misdescribed the color of the front 
door of the home as the court found that this mistake was 
"trivial" given that the warrant otherwise described 
appellees' home accurately. The court then ruled that the 
agents acted lawfully in using a battering ram to break 
down the front door. 
 
The district court, however, refused to grant summary 
judgment to the agents with respect to their conduct once 
they entered the home. Although the court found that their 
treatment of Dominguez and the children was "reasonable, 
and indeed, duly considerate under the circumstances," the 
court was "unable to find that the agents' conduct . . . was 
reasonable and not excessive" with respect to Torres's 
handcuffing for the duration of the search. 
 
The court then concluded that the agents exceeded the 
scope of the warrant when they searched the appellees' 
entire home rather than just the basement. Although the 
warrant specifically authorized a search of "the property 
known as 3936 N. 5th Street, Philadelphia, PA," the court 
determined that the warrant was "circumscribed" by the 
supporting probable cause affidavit, which stated that 
cocaine was stored in the basement. The court then 
indicated, however, that it was "possible" that exigent 
circumstances (specifically, the presence of weapons and 
ammunition) justified a broader search of the entire home. 
 
Overall the district court's memorandum opinion is 
ambiguous with respect to its disposition of the agents' 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified 
immunity for their conduct in searching beyond the 
basement. The court may have intended to grant the agents 
summary judgment based on its finding of exigent 
circumstances, but its use of the word "possible" suggests 
that the court found a factual issue for trial and hence 
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denied summary judgment. Indeed, even the agents are 
uncertain as to how the court ruled for they explain in their 
reply brief that the "district court appears to have found 
that the scope of the search was probably supported by 
exigent circumstances, but reserved judgment." Reply br. at 
4 n.2.3 Moreover, the agents in their opening brief defended 
the validity of the search to the extent that it went beyond 
the basement. Plainly, they would have had no reason to 
brief that issue if they had been granted summary 
judgment on it. In the circumstances, we conclude that the 
district court denied summary judgment with respect to 
appellees' claims that the search unconstitutionally 
exceeded the scope of the warrant. 
 
The district court further ruled that the agents acted 
unlawfully by seizing items not specifically listed in the 
warrant. The district court later reconsidered this ruling, 
however, and in an order of January 5, 1999, granted 
summary judgment in the agents' favor as to the seizure of 
items from appellees' home. 
 
The court also addressed appellees' allegation that the 
agents "destroy[ed] doors, ripp[ed] out ceilings and walls 
and overturn[ed] clothes and toys" during the search. The 
court found no evidence in the record to support this 
allegation, but refused to grant the agents summary 
judgment on the issue because their motion papers did not 
specifically address the property damage claim. Finally, the 
court held that appellees lacked standing to maintain any 
claims with respect to warrantless searches of other 
properties (specifically, Torres's place of employment and 
property belonging to Torres's father) which allegedly took 
place on the day in question. 
 
Agents Donahue, Caplan, Kelly, Capone, and Cohen, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Actually, the agents hedge on the point as they also contend that the 
district court "granted qualified immunity and ruled in favor of the 
defendants on all but two of [appellees' constitutional] claims: the 
duration of the restraint of Torres, and excessive damage to the 
residence." Reply br. at 2. It appears that the agents quite naturally 
would like to read the district court's opinion as granting them qualified 
immunity on the scope of the search issue but are unwilling to forego 
briefing the issue. 
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appeal to the extent that the district court denied them 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In 
particular, the question they present is whether the district 
court should have granted qualified immunity to them with 
respect to the following aspects of their conduct in 
executing the search warrant: (1) leaving Torres handcuffed 
for the duration of the search; (2) searching the entire 
premises rather than just the basement; and (3) causing 
excessive damage to the walls, ceilings, and other items in 
the home.4 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1346 and we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 pursuant to the collateral 
order doctrine, as applied to qualified immunity cases. See 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985). 
We exercise plenary review over the district court's denial of 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See 
Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2393 (1999). 
 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "[g]overnment 
officials performing discretionary functions are`shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " 
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 
2727, 2738 (1982)); In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 
945, 961 (3d Cir. 1995). The inquiry when a defendant 
claims qualified immunity is "whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, in 
light of the clearly established law and the information in 
the officer's possession." Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 826. Officers 
who "reasonably but mistakenly" conclude that their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The appellees have challenged the district court's decision to the 
extent that it granted the agents summary judgment but those issues 
are not before us on this appeal. The district court partially granted and 
partially denied the government's motion for summary judgment on the 
Tort Claims Act issues but those dispositions as well are not before us. 
 
                                7 
  
conduct is lawful are thus entitled to immunity. Id. A court, 
however, need not consider whether the right implicated 
was clearly established at the time of the events in question 
if the plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of a 
constitutional right. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 
(1999); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 
n.5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 
U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789 (1991); Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 
154 F.3d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1037 
(1999). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Handcuffing of Torres 
 
The first question before us is whether the agents acted 
lawfully in their treatment of Torres during the execution of 
the search. If they did, then they were entitled to qualified 
immunity because the appellees would not have "alleged a 
deprivation of a constitutional right at all." Lewis, 523 U.S. 
at 841 n.5, 118 S.Ct. at 1714 n.5. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that officers executing a 
search warrant lawfully may restrain persons present at the 
searched premises. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981) ("[A] warrant to 
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly 
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants 
of the premises while a proper search is conducted.") 
(footnotes omitted). In Summers, the Supreme Court noted 
that a warrant to search for narcotics "may give rise to 
sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence," and thus the risk of harm to officers and 
occupants alike "is minimized if the officers routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Id. at 
702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. The Supreme Court indicated 
that the officers might exceed their proper authority in an 
"unusual case" involving "special circumstances, or 
possibly a prolonged detention," but the "routine" detention 
of residents while a search is conducted is constitutional. 
Id. at 705 n.21, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 n.21. 
 
Further, case law has indicated that at least in certain 
circumstances officers lawfully may handcuff the occupants 
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of the premises while executing a search warrant. In United 
States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993), officers 
executing a search warrant for narcotics and firearms 
handcuffed the occupants of the house and forced them to 
lie face down on the floor while they conducted the search. 
Id. at 659-60. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
held that the detention was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment: 
 
        When occupants of a residence are detained during 
       the execution of a search warrant, the circumstances 
       ordinarily will justify more intrusive behavior by the 
       police than in a typical on-the-street detention. When 
       the ATF agents entered Fountain's home pursuant to 
       the warrant to search for narcotics, they faced a 
       confined, unfamiliar environment that was likely to be 
       dangerous. [The occupants] were handcuffed and 
       forced to lie face down on the living room floor while 
       the search was conducted. Concern for safety of the 
       agents and the need to prevent disposal of any 
       narcotics on the premises, justified the restraint of the 
       occupants, particularly under the circumstances of this 
       case, where the search was part of a narcotics 
       investigation and weapons had been seized from the 
       home just one month earlier. The `character' of the 
       intrusion on [the occupants] and its `justification' were 
       reasonable and proportional to law enforcement's 
       legitimate interests in preventing flight in the event 
       incriminating evidence is found and in minimizing the 
       risk of harm to officers. Those concerns plainly 
       outweighed the intrusion experienced by [the 
       occupants] in being required to be on the living room 
       floor while the search was completed. . . . 
 
Id. at 663; see also Van Brackle v. Parole Bd., No. Civ. A. 
96-2276, 1996 WL 544229, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1996) 
(holding that the detention of an occupant in handcuffs 
during a search was lawful) (citing Fountain). 
 
On the other hand, handcuffing may be excessive in 
certain circumstances. In Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873 
(9th Cir. 1994), the court held that officers executing a 
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment when they carried 
a seriously disabled man from his bed and left him 
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handcuffed on a couch for over two hours with nothing to 
cover the lower half of his body. Id. at 874-78. Though the 
man complained that his handcuffs hurt and that he was 
cold, the officers waited an hour before adjusting the cuffs 
and giving him a blanket. Id. at 882 (Brunetti, J., 
concurring). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
labeled the officers' conduct "wanton[ ] and callous[ ]" and 
found that this was an example of the "unusual case" 
envisioned by Summers. Id. at 876-78. Accordingly, the 
court reversed a bench trial judgment in favor of the 
officers. Id. at 874. Moreover, in a concurring opinion, one 
judge stated that the officers' conduct was so egregious as 
to preclude any claims of qualified immunity on remand. Id. 
at 878-80 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 
In Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d Cir. 
1995), we indicated that officers acted excessively when 
they handcuffed a mother and her teenage children who 
happened to be approaching a residence for a social visit 
when the officers arrived to execute a search warrant. See 
id. at 1192-94. The plaintiffs claimed that the officers left 
them handcuffed for 25 minutes and pointed guns at them. 
Id. at 1189, 1192-93. Noting that the "use of guns and 
handcuffs must be justified by the circumstances," id. at 
1193, we reversed a summary judgment in favor of an 
officer, holding that a Fourth Amendment violation could be 
established if the plaintiffs' allegations regarding their 
treatment were true. See id. at 1192-94 ("[T]he appearances 
were those of a family paying a social visit . . .[T]here is 
simply no evidence of anything that should have caused the 
officers to use the kind of force they are alleged to have 
used.").5 
 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to appellees, 
we are of the view that the agents' treatment of Torres was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Baker did not present a qualified immunity issue. Rather, the district 
court had granted summary judgment in favor of an officer on the 
ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he had 
participated in or had knowledge of the treatment the plaintiffs suffered. 
Baker, 50 F.3d at 1189. We reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' 
testimony, if true, would support a Fourth Amendment claim against the 
officer. See id. at 1192-94. 
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lawful.6 The agents left Torres on the floor for only five 
minutes, and then helped him to the couch, where he still 
had his towel to cover himself. Moreover, the agents 
permitted Dominguez and the children to sit with Torres 
while the search was conducted. The agents directed"nice 
comments" to the children, and they permitted Dominguez 
to prepare breakfast for the children. The agents also 
permitted Dominguez to call her supervisor to say that she 
would be missing work. The agents loosened Torres's 
handcuffs after he twice indicated to them that they were 
too tight. The agents did not point their guns after the 
initial moments following their entry into the home, and 
Torres testified that the agents "didn't harm any of us." 
Further, the duration of the search was not excessive under 
the circumstances, given the size of the home (two stories 
plus a basement). 
 
On these facts, the agents' conduct is far from analogous 
to the excessive behavior of the officers in Franklin and 
Baker. As the Supreme Court indicated in Summers, the 
execution of a narcotics search warrant "may give rise to 
sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 
evidence," and thus officers are entitled to"routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation." 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. The 
agents had good reason to fear violence or destruction of 
evidence as they entered the appellees' home because they 
had cause to believe that the premises was a key location 
in a large-scale cocaine ring. Further, Torres informed the 
agents in the initial moments of the search that there were 
two weapons in the home. Moreover, the agents retrieved 
firearms, a Glock 9mm semiautomatic and a Ruger .357 
magnum, which might be associated with a violent drug 
operation. The officers also found ammunition for a third 
type of firearm that they did not locate during their search 
but which they feared might be present. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that determining whether officers have used excessive force is 
a fact-specific inquiry, taking into account such factors as the severity 
of 
the crime, any threat to officer safety, any active resistance, and any 
injury resulting to the person restrained. See Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d 
117, 122 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2051 (1999). 
 
                                11 
  
The circumstances confronting the agents were such that 
they had reason to be concerned for their safety. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the agents acted lawfully in 
their treatment of Torres. Therefore, they are entitled to 
qualified immunity with respect to claims regarding that 
treatment. 
 
B. Extent of the Search 
 
The second question before us is whether the agents 
acted lawfully in searching beyond the basement of the 
home. If they did, then they were entitled to qualified 
immunity on this claim as well because the appellees would 
not have "alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at 
all." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5, 118 S.Ct. at 1714 n.5. 
 
The warrant authorized a search of "the property known 
as 3936 N. 5th Street, Philadelphia, PA." Although the 
probable cause affidavit stated that Nieves stored cocaine in 
five-gallon cans in the basement of the premises, the 
affidavit recited other items the location of which were not 
expressly limited to any particular portion of the building. 
The affidavit stated that "[w]hile inside the premises with 
NIEVES in January, 1996" the confidential informant saw 
"diluents [sic], a scale, a heat sealer for the packages of 
cocaine, and a vise which NIEVES used to crush the 
hardpacked cocaine." Furthermore, according to the 
affidavit, Nieves repeatedly told the confidential informant 
that he was continuing to use 3936 North Fifth Street to 
store and package cocaine, and the informant saw Nieves's 
truck parked outside the building on January 3, 1997, just 
a few weeks before the search warrant was executed. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] lawful search of 
fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which 
the object of the search may be found." United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170 (1982). In 
this regard, we point out that courts specifically have held 
that a warrant encompasses the authority to search the 
entire building if the person who is the target of the search 
has access to or control over the entire premises. See, e.g., 
United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(where a building is being used as a single unit,"a finding 
of probable cause as to a portion of the premises is 
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sufficient to support a search of the entire structure"; a 
search of the entire premises is permitted where the target 
of the investigation "exercised `dominion and control' over 
the entire building or had access to the entire structure") 
(citation omitted); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 
1008 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[A] warrant may authorize a search 
of an entire street address while reciting probable cause as 
to only a portion of the premises if they are occupied in 
common rather than individually, if a multiunit building is 
used as a single entity, if the [alleged wrongdoer] was in 
control of the whole premises, or if the entire premises are 
suspect."); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
S 4.5, at 41 (3d ed. Supp. 1999) ("The obvious point is that 
when a resident apparently has the run of the premises, 
there is no reason to conclude that the warrant must be 
limited to the precise spot where the items sought 
happened to be when observed on a prior occasion."); cf. 
Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145 (3d Cir.) (habeas corpus 
petition denied in controlled substance constructive 
possession case where lessee-petitioner had access and 
control over all areas of an apartment even though the 
substance was found in a bedroom occupied by petitioner's 
brother), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1268, 117 S.Ct. 2442 
(1997). 
 
The building at 3936 North Fifth Street was not a multi- 
unit premises with separate areas controlled by separate 
residents. Rather, it was a traditional two-story home with 
bedrooms upstairs, a dining room and kitchen downstairs, 
and a basement accessible through the dining room. 
Accordingly, the warrant authorized the search of the entire 
building and the appellees did not allege a violation of a 
constitutional right at all on the scope of the search claim. 
Therefore, the agents are entitled to qualified immunity on 
that claim. 
 
In reaching our result, we recognize that the appellees' 
amended complaint with respect to the scope of the search 
is very general, as it merely alleges that the agents 
"conducted an excessive and unreasonable search." 
Nevertheless, we are of the view that a plaintiff by a 
generalized pleading should not be deemed to have alleged 
a deprivation of a constitutional right so as to defeat a 
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claim of immunity when an inquiry into the undisputed 
facts demonstrates that there is no basis for the claim. 
After all, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-39 (1987), made it 
clear that when an officer claims immunity on the ground 
that he or she did not violate a clearly established 
constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable 
person would have known the plaintiff 's claim must be 
considered in a specific context rather than in an abstract 
generalized sense. We think that the same standard must 
be applied in determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a 
violation of a constitutional right in the first place. 
 
C. Damage to the Home 
 
The district court found that there was no evidence to 
support appellees' allegation that the agents caused 
excessive damage to doors, ceilings, walls, and other 
property inside the home, but nevertheless declined to 
grant summary judgment because the agents' motion 
papers did not specifically address the property damage 
claim. We are constrained to dismiss the appeal insofar as 
it relates to this claim because we are without power to 
inquire into the sufficiency of a plaintiff 's evidence on an 
appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. See Johnson v. 
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (1995). 
Despite the district court's view, we find that on the record 
before us there are questions of fact relating to the 
allegation that the agents caused excessive damage once 
inside the premises. While we do not foreclose the agents 
from making another motion for summary judgment on the 
point, see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306-11, 116 
S.Ct. 834, 838-41 (1996), as the record now stands, the 
appellees' claim with respect to excessive damage must be 
resolved at trial. We do point out, however, that because it 
could be anticipated that contraband would be secreted, a 
reasonable officer would believe that at least in some 
circumstances he or she would not violate clearly 
established constitutional or statutory rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known in damaging a 
premises in executing a search warrant. 
 
D. Agent Donahue 
 
While the district court believed that Donahue was 
present when the warrant was executed, the parties agree 
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that he was not there. Accordingly, Donahue is entitled to 
qualified immunity as to all of appellees' claims arising 
from the execution of the warrant. Of course, this 
conclusion takes him out of the case, as the district court 
found that the appellees failed to allege a constitutional 
violation up to and including the agents' initial entry into 
the appellees' home. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Donahue is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to 
each of the claims at issue on this appeal. The other agents 
are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the 
handcuffing of Torres and their conduct in searching 
beyond the basement of the home, but their appeal will be 
dismissed with respect to appellees' claim that they did 
excessive damage during the search. Accordingly, we will 
remand the matter to the district court to enter summary 
judgment on all issues in favor of Donohue and to enter 
summary judgment in favor of the other agents to the 
extent that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The 
parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                15 
